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AN “INFORMATION LITERACY” PERSPECTIVE 
OF  THE CREATION/EVOLUTION 
DEBATE
Terry D. roberTson
Andrews University
Introduction
The pedagogical mission of  my profession as a librarian is to train in 
“information literacy.” Within the context of  higher education that is 
conceived of  generally as instructing a student in using library resources 
to complete an academic writing assignment. The Association of  College 
Research Libraries has identified the broad set of  competencies required for 
this task, summarized as the ability to define an information need, and find, 
evaluate, and then use it ethically.1 Of  particular interest is how we mentor the 
effective evaluation of  information in an information-saturated culture.2
The creation/evolution debate provides an intriguing case study on 
the process of  evaluating information for the following reason: The two 
accounts are mutually exclusive. The information seeker cannot accept both 
as true. Often this results in accepting one as true and the other as false.3 
And the distinctive accounts highlight the function of  standard criteria 
generally presented in information literacy training: authority, independent 
corroboration, plausibility and support, and presentation.4 
This essay will discuss the creation/evolution debate from the perspective 
of  the novice information seeker, discussing and applying the principles of  
1Patricia Iannuzzi et al., Information Literacy Competency Standards for Higher Education 
(Chicago: Association of  College and Research Libraries, 2000).
2The professional literature on information literacy is vast. Some good overviews 
include: John Budd, Framing Library Instruction (Chicago: Association of  College and 
Research Libraries, 2009); Michael Eisenberg, Carrie A. Lowe, and Kathleen L. Spitzer, 
Information Literacy: Essential Skills for the Information Age, 2d ed. (Westport, CT: Libraries 
Unlimited, 2004); Ann Grafstein, “A Discipline-Based Approach to Information 
Literacy,” Journal of  Academic Librarianship 28/4 (2002): 197-204.
3Delimiting this discussion to the biblical-creation account and the standard 
evolutionary account is arbitrary in that virtually all religions and cultures have unique 
creation accounts, e.g., each of  the ancient cultures of  Babylon, Greece, and Egypt 
had well-articulated accounts; Native American cultures have their accounts; and so 
forth. However, unlike most creation accounts, the two under consideration in this 
discussion both make a scientific claim to reality.
4Don Fallis, “On Verifying the Accuracy of  Information: Philosophical 
Perspectives,” Library Trends 52/3 (2004): 464-465. This article focuses on the 
evaluation of  information found on internet web sites, more particularly on the 
accuracy of  information, e.g., in the case of  medical information.
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information literacy. Ultimately, it will be suggested that these strategies can 
go only so far, and that criteria for accepting one account over the other 
will be based on subjective metaphysical presuppositions which find grounds 
formed through faith in an authority. It can also be assumed that, given the 
social context of  this journal, I will argue for the biblical-creation account.
Working Definition of  Information
Defining the term “information” has always been problematic because 
both the word and concept are used in many ways and in so many different 
contexts.5 Thus, for the purposes of  this essay, the term will be delimited 
to the semantic vehicle by which knowledge is exchanged between two 
minds. This supposes a commodified form of  communication medium using 
symbols that record the knowledge of  an informer which can then be accessed 
independently by any number of  informees.6 The most common information 
vehicles pertinent to the religion-and-science debate in the academic context 
are books and journals, whether analog or digital.7
A further distinction needs to be made.8 Some information (the 
knowledge obtained by an author expressed in a semantically commodified 
form) is descriptive. This class of  information applies to those facts which 
can be verified independently in real time. I as an individual may not be able 
to visit the pyramids of  Giza, so for information about the pyramids I rely 
on pictures and on what other competent authors have written. I am certain 
that if  I were to travel to Egypt, I would find the pyramids as they have 
described them. The location on the map would correspond, as well as any 
measurements I might make.
A second class of  information (knowledge of  an author expressed in 
a semantically commodified form) incorporates the further analysis and 
interpretation of  verifiable descriptive information by the author. In the case 
5Dan Schiller, How to Think About Information (Urbana: University of  Illinois 
Press, 2007). Schiller’s discussion of  the capitalistic commodification of  information 
in a global context highlights many of  the challenges the novice information seeker 
must take into account, including but not limited to the economic infrastructure that 
delivered the information.
6Albert Bormann, Holding on to Reality: The Nature of  Information at the Turn of  
the Millennium (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 1999), 22. His definition for 
information is also multifaceted: “INTELLIGENCE provided, a PERSON is 
informed by a SIGN about some THING within a certain CONTEXT.”
7For a helpful distinction between knowledge and information, see Peter Suber, 
“Knowledge as a Public Good,” SPARC Open Access Newsletter, 2 November 2009, n. 
130 (http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/fos/newsletter/11-02-09.htm#publicgood).
8These distinctions reflect the discussion by Luciano Floridi, “Semantic 
Conceptions of  Information,” Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.
edu/entries/information-semantic).
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of  the pyramids of  Giza, this class of  information is illustrated by discussions 
of  their history, methods of  construction, religious significance for the 
builders, and so forth. Competent authorities have come to their conclusions 
on these matters, not because they were personally present and observed these 
events; but from their analysis of  historical documents and their awareness 
of  the social world of  the builders, they have made logical inferences that 
they believe represent the way things happened. While I might be able to 
access some of  the same historical documents and artifacts, I must accept 
their “interpretation” as simply that, and then decide whether or not they are 
justified in their conclusions. This is not a simple, straightforward matter of  
independent verification.
When evaluating the first class of  information, the information seeker 
thinks in categories of  accuracy and completeness, and believes it or not 
in terms of  certainty. As for the second class, categories revolve around 
the reliability of  the author, both in terms of  method and bias, and the 
information seeker believes the information or not in terms of  confidence. 
In other words, this is a theoretical expansion of  the distinction between 
verifying facts and validating opinions.
While these kinds of  distinctions are helpful in theory, actually confronting 
theological texts and scientific texts that give an account of  human origins is 
much more complex. Whether supporting the biblical creation account or 
the standard evolutionary account, the authors are expressing their beliefs 
using the rhetoric of  certainty and the language of  factuality. Thus for the 
novice information seeker, the normal clues by which she categorizes fact and 
opinion may not be self-evident. Also, claims to authority not directly related 
to the content but present in the ambient culture may also prove influential in 
the evaluation process.9
In terms of  the creation/evolution debate, my argument also assumes 
that the facts, those which can be observed and measured in real time by 
competent individuals, are not at issue.10 That there is a geologic column 
evident in the Grand Canyon is equally evident to all geologists, both 
creationist and evolutionist. That the fossilized bones found on a southwest 
Michigan farm and on display at Andrews University are from an extinct 
mammoth is uncontested knowledge for paleontologists. That species have 
adapted to their environment through an evolutionary process so that certain 
breeds of  domesticated cattle that thrive in arid temperate climates do vary 
9As lamented by Gilbert Keith Chesterton: “Modern intelligence won’t accept 
anything on authority. But it will accept anything without authority” (The Man Who 
Knew Too Much [New York: Harper, 1922], 180).
10Steve Fuller, “Evidence? What Evidence?” Philosophy of  the Social Sciences (http://
pos.sagepub.com/content/early/2011/03/10/0048393111402778.citation).
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significantly from those that thrive in humid tropical climates is common 
knowledge for biologists.
My argument is based, however, on the understanding that it is the 
inferences and interpretations of  such generally accepted facts that has led to 
mutually exclusive accounts of  human origins.11 It is this phenomenon that 
poses a substantive problem for the novice information seeker. But we should 
not simply reduce what can be known to the immediately observable, particularly 
in the context of  this debate. Doing so would leave us with nothing more than 
perhaps interesting but rather insignificant trivia. It is also appreciated that the 
overarching hope of  this debate is that these inferences and interpretations that 
take us beyond the facts will contribute to the understanding of  the meaning 
or purpose of  human life.12 And it is also that larger purpose that renders 
the epistemic choice between the biblical creation account and the standard 
evolutionary account so psychologically compelling.
The Evaluation of  Information
In the previous section, I argued for a definition of  information as knowledge 
of  an author expressed in a semantically commodified form. Within this 
definition, I distinguished between information that is verifiable in real 
time and information that has the added value of  authorial inference and 
interpretation. In this section, I will discuss the various facets that are 
incorporated into the information literacy evaluation process.
Most educated and socially aware persons are tacitly adept at evaluating 
everyday informational knowledge exchanges, and so are able, for example, 
11Ibid. “Scientists who wish to embed their findings in more explicitly theoretical 
agendas are limited by the peer-review process. This leads ID [Intelligent Design]/
creationists to complain (rightly) of  a ‘naturalistic’ philosophical bias that allows 
scientific authors to use their articles’ introductions and conclusions to articulate their 
findings in terms of  broader Neo-Darwinian research themes but not those of  ID/
creationism, even though the same findings could be understood in those terms too. 
As a result of  this asymmetrical treatment at the reviewer stage, ID/creationism is 
effectively censored before it can enter the scientific literature—unless ID/creationists 
manage to come up with testable hypotheses the success of  which could not be 
explained equally well in Neo-Darwinian terms.”
12Roger Smith, Being Human: Historical Knowledge and the Creation of  Human Nature 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 240-241. “No one will question the 
unparalleled precision of  the natural sciences. But knowledge about what makes a 
person significant, or an institution just, or a claim to truth persuasive, or a moment 
of  perception beautiful, has a different character. It requires knowledge of  particulars 
set in a story. Historically deracinated abstract knowledge, exemplified in the physical 
sciences, establishes no meaning, differentiates no shades of  significance and points 
in no direction relevant to knowing what to do. It is knowledge about particulars, the 
place of  people and events in a story, which opens such possibilities.”
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to recognize advertising hype or political propaganda for what it is, while also 
sifting out what is true and adding it to their own knowledge fund. However, 
academic-writing scenarios are not everyday knowledge exchanges, but rather 
a specialized and contextualized form. The challenge facing the information 
seeker in this setting is that not all information is created equal, and discretion 
is needed to select the most reliable sources.
That the engagement of  such critical-thinking dispositions is necessary 
is based on the observed reality that the human minds that create the 
information are by nature limited and constrained in a number of  significant 
ways, including space, time, language, and expertise. When the information is 
incomplete or inaccurate because of  limitations imposed on the informer, it 
is described as misinformation. Cases are also plentiful in which the informer 
intentionally attempts to manipulate the informee for some personal gain; thus 
disinformation abounds.13 The burden of  recognizing these counter-informing 
objects falls on the informee, who is also constrained by the same limitations. 
But it is the informee that bears the consequences of  any misjudgment.14
Key criteria have been outlined for evaluating information and providing 
the novice with some initial guidance. These include verifying the authority of  
the source, seeking independent corroboration of  factual claims, reviewing 
the plausibility and support for the propositions, and observing the clues 
embedded in the presentation of  the information. It is also assumed that 
using these reliable methods to evaluate information will produce reliable 
results. A corollary to this thesis is that reliable sources are more likely to 
provide reliable information.15
However, in spite of  the general success that these methods offer for 
recognizing good information, two cautions are in order. The first has been 
labeled the “information cascade.”16 In this scenario, a proposition has been 
13Bernd Carsten Stahl, “On the Difference or Equality of  Information, 
Misinformation, and Disinformation: A Critical Research Perspective,” Informing Science 
Journal 9 (2006): 83-96.
14Fallis, 464-466.
15John M. Budd, “Academic Libraries and Knowledge: A Social Epistemology 
Framework,” Journal of  Academic Librarianship 30/5 (2004): 365-366. Budd is arguing 
that the library should take an active role rather than a passive role in both their 
instructional and collection development capacities when helping information seekers 
find accurate and reliable information.
16Originally coined and described in Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, 
and Ivo Welch, “A Theory of  Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as 
Informational Cascades,” Journal of  Political Economy 100/5 (1992): 992-1026. For 
summary and updated bibliography, see Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, and 
Ivo Welch, “Information Cascades and Rational Herding: An Annotated Bibliography 
and Resource Reference,” Working Paper: UCLA/Anderson and Ohio State University 
and Yale/SOM (http://www.info-cascades.info).
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accepted as true because it seems reliable, though it is false, and spreads 
throughout a generally reliable academic discipline through standard citation 
practices. Thus the false proposition appears to have authority, independent 
corroboration, and plenty of  disciplinary support with what appears to be 
a competent presentation. One classic example is the claim that Eskimos 
have many words for snow, and the assertion coheres well with the general 
appreciation for the effect of  environment on language. The assertion was 
accepted as true by many in academic circles until it was tested and proved 
false.17 Another long-accepted example is found in the claim that there are 
parallels to the story of  Job in the Hindu literature. When the citation evidence 
was traced back to its source, the claim was proven unwarranted.18
A second caution concerns epistemic circularity, in which a claim is 
supported only by reference to authority, plausibility, or presentation, and 
not by mind-independent reference to fact. In the courtroom, this class of  
information is usually rejected as hearsay. In other words, “one seeks to 
defend or demonstrate the reliability of  a source in ways that require relying 
on beliefs generated by that source.”19 Critics of  religion have long made this 
case for religious beliefs.20
Epistemology of  Testimony
Because there are no eyewitnesses of  human origins, and because the origin 
event(s) cannot be replicated, we must infer how it happened based on possibly 
related real-time observations of  phenomena and processes. Such inference 
leads a person to belief, and hence to knowledge. When that knowledge is 
communicated anew, the added content of  interpretation and inference to the 
description of  the original basic facts takes on the characteristics of  testimony. 
17Laura Martin, “‘Eskimo Words for Snow’: A Case Study in the Genesis and Decay 
of  an Anthropological Example,” American Anthropologist 88/2 (1986): 418-423.
18D. J. A. Clines, “In Search of  the Indian Job,” VT 33/4 (1983): 398-418.
19Ralph Baergen, Historical Dictionary of  Epistemology, Historical Dictionaries of  
Religions, Philosophies, and Movements, 70 (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2006), 65.
20William P. Alston, “Knowledge of  God,” in Faith, Reason, and Skepticism: Essays, 
ed. Marcus B. Hester (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 43-44. The paper 
critiques an internalist version of  epistemology in which a belief  can supposedly be 
justified in a noncircular reflective fashion, in which Alston argues little if  anything 
can then be known. The context of  the article is a response to skeptics who claim 
knowledge of  God cannot be justified. “Its externalist competitor has much more 
going for it as a general orientation in epistemology, and it opens up possibilities for 
knowledge of  God that are closed to internalism. The price of  this, however, is a 
renunciation of  the aim at a noncircular demonstration of  the reliability of  our sources 
of  knowledge and an abandonment of  hopes for the autonomy of  epistemology.”
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The evaluation of  this enriched class of  information can be instructed by 
recent work in the epistemology of  testimony.21
That most of  our knowledge has been gained from testimony is commonly 
noted. The simple human limitation of  being able to inhabit only one unit 
of  space and only one moment at a time in a linear sequence restricts our 
opportunities to form knowledge from only perception and memory. Relying 
on the testimony of  others expands our intellectual horizons and empowers 
us to efficiently contribute to the collective knowledge of  the community. 
There are two main schools of  thought as to the epistemic value of  
testimony in belief  formation. Reductionists, following David Hume, require 
that testimony must have independent corroboration before it can be used 
to justify new belief. Antireductionists, following Thomas Reid, claim that 
testimony can be used to justify new belief  without positive corroboration in 
the absence of  evidence to the contrary.22 In the course of  the debate between 
the two positions, many examples and counterexamples demonstrate the 
insufficiency of  unilaterally adopting either position. Jennifer Lackey argues 
that the reductionist position best describes the epistemic duty of  the hearer in 
that she must assess the reliability of  the source, and that the antireductionist 
position describes the epistemic effort of  the speaker, whose objective is to 
present a rational argument. Thus the communication exchange of  information 
between two minds is a dualism. It follows that if  the speaker is first successful 
in rationally justifying a claim through corroboration with factual knowledge, 
then the hearer can subsequently accept the claim as reliable without further 
epistemic work, since such further corroboration would be redundant.23
Applied to academia, “information literacy” encompasses both the 
evaluation of  information by an information seeker, which includes the 
epistemic task of  incorporating new information into her knowledge base. 
The seeker is first a “hearer” and, by predetermining which are trustworthy 
sources, can accept the information provided as valid unless there are obvious 
reasons for rejecting the information as such. The informee/hearer in turn is 
expected to give expression to that newly acquired knowledge by authoring 
a new unique commodified information product. In authoring this new 
product, the informee/hearer becomes an informer/speaker and must adhere 
21In addition to many articles, the following books provide a representative study 
of  the epistemology of  testimony: C. A. J. Coady, Testimony: A Philosophical Study (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1992); S. Goldberg, Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, 
Knowledge and Justification (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); A. I. Goldman, 
Knowledge in a Social World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); J. Lackey and 
E. Sosa, eds., The Epistemology of  Testimony (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); 
Nicholas Wolterstorff, Thomas Reid and the Story of  Epistemology, Modern European 
Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
22Baergen, 210-211.
23Lackey, 177.
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to the epistemic responsibility of  providing validated information for the 
intended audience, a new information seeker. Lackey’s dualism is pertinent for 
understanding the information-literacy cycle because the informee/informer 
incorporates both reductionist and antireductionist epistemic work in this new 
commodified information product. This line of  argument highlights the social 
aspect of  knowledge acquisition. Thus, the student author is expected to use 
trustworthy sources, and then provide trustworthy information in her written 
work, which, in turn, becomes an information source for a subsequent seeker.
Here is the crux of  the problem facing a novice information seeker in a query 
about human origins. Both the biblical creation and the standard evolutionary 
accounts reflect interpretations of  factual data, i.e., the objective, measurable 
phenomenon observed and recorded by multiple independent and competent 
persons in real time. Both accounts are supported by socially recognized and 
generally reliable communities following apparently sound methodological 
standards. Neither can claim the certainty of  formal documented historical 
human eyewitnesses. Particularly in the case of  geology, the inferences are 
drawn from relatively scanty and ambiguous data for which multiple plausible 
interpretations are inevitable.24 Both could just as easily be cited by their 
critics as an example of  information cascading, or could be demonstrated to 
be nothing more than a vicious testimonial circle. Scientists who hold to the 
biblical creation account are just as rigorous and thorough with the objective 
observable data as are scientists who hold to the standard evolutionary account. 
Criteria that normally would provide clues in the evaluation of  this class of  
testimonial information do not provide conclusive answers.
One further contingency comes into play in the creation/evolution 
debate. Because of  the socially constructed nature of  the rhetoric, how a 
person evaluates a given proposition in the debate is based less on the 
potential truthfulness of  the argument and more on what fits the worldview 
of  the information seeker. Thus what generally happens is that a novice 
information seeker, who has been immersed in the standard evolutionary 
account throughout elementary and secondary education, and without social 
intervention from home and a faith community, will find the evidential claims 
supporting evolution more compelling. On the other hand, one who has 
been educated in a social context, whether family or church, that assumes the 
biblical creation account will find the evidence supporting that account more 
24Henry N. Pollack, Uncertain Science . . . Uncertain World (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 149. “Dealing with uncertainty about the past is a way of  life 
with geologists, who in their work of  reconstructing natural history are always working 
with half  a deck or less. Nature is not a mindful conservator, and the inevitable 
consequence of  time is that the record of  what happened long ago becomes degraded 
and fragmentary. In their efforts to understand and interpret incomplete information, 
geologists always work with a handful of  provisional scenarios relevant to explaining 
their observations.”
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compelling. This tendency reflects both the contextually formed worldview 
and prior knowledge of  the informee.25 How the informee then handles the 
ambiguities and knowledge gaps within the diverse accounts is indicative 
of  her critical thinking dispositions, which are, again, open to critique and 
evaluation by observers who have their own commitments.
C. S. Lewis illustrated the interplay of  worldview, prior knowledge, and 
logic in the task of  evaluating testimony in The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe. 
After Lucy’s second visit to Narnia with her brother Edmund, their older 
siblings brought the younger two to discuss their tale with the old Professor. 
Lucy’s claim did not fit their worldview, while Edmund’s did, thus the concern. 
After reviewing the particulars, in which Lucy claimed the events as true, and 
Edmund claimed Lucy’s account was false and that they were just pretending, 
the Professor asks the pertinent question: 
“For instance—if  you will excuse me for asking the question—does your 
experience lead you to regard your brother or your sister as the more 
reliable? I mean, which is the more truthful?”
“That’s just the funny thing about it, sir,” said Peter. “Up till now, I’d have 
said Lucy every time.”
The anxiety they were feeling was created by the dissonance between 
their worldview and the cumulative prior knowledge based on experience. 
After some further discussion about another possibility, the Professor directs 
the conversation to critical-thinking dispositions for an answer.
“Logic!” said the Professor half  to himself. “Why don’t they teach logic at 
these schools? There are only three possibilities. Either your sister is telling 
lies, or she is mad, or she is telling the truth. You know she doesn’t tell lies 
and it is obvious that she is not mad. For the moment then and unless any 
further evidence turns up, we must assume she is telling the truth.”26
25Michael Polanyi states: “All practical teaching, the teaching of  comprehension in 
all the senses of  the term, is based on authority. The student must be confident that his 
master understands what he is trying to teach him and that he, the student, will eventually 
succeed in his turn to understand the meaning of  the things which are being explained 
to him” (“Faith and Reason,” JR 41/4 [1961]: 243). Lesslie Newbigin notes that “Reason 
is not an independent means for finding out what is the case. It is not a substitute for 
information. In order to be informed, we have to make acts of  trust in the traditions we 
have inherited and in the evidence of  our senses. Moreover, . . . all systematic reasoning 
has to begin by taking for granted certain things that are accepted without argument. 
There must be data without argument or, at least, without prior demonstration. . . . 
There exists no neutral reason that can decide impartially on the truth or falsehood of  
the Christian gospel. On the contrary, if  it is true that Jesus is the Word made flesh, then 
to know Jesus must be the basis of  all true knowledge” (Proper Confidence: Faith, Doubt, and 
Certainty in Christian Discipleship [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995], 96).
26Clive Stapleton Lewis, The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe (Grand Rapids: 
Zondervan, 2000), 47-48.
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To summarize, the case study of  applying information-literacy practices 
to the creation/evolution debate has not provided any decisive conclusions. 
The only difference between the two accounts seems to be the rhetoric 
of  invention arising out of  differing worldviews.27 Unless there is a way to 
critique these distinctive worldviews, then the only conclusion is that the two 
accounts are equally valid. Except that intuitive logic cannot accept that being 
the case.28 Whereas they may both be false, only one can be true.
Biblical Creation 
Account
Standard Evolutionary 
Account
Authority Eyewitness account of  
the Creator, as reported 
in texts and accepted for 
millennia as authoritative 
by Jews and Christians.
The general reputation of  science, 
as defined by scientism, which 
purports to provide answers based 
on verifiable sense perception. 
Responsible for substantive progress 
in knowledge and evidenced in 
advances in technology and medicine. 
Accepted for a couple of  centuries, 
but recently challenged.
Corroboration Evidence of  intelligent 
design and lack 
of  evidence for 
evolutionary cross-
speciation. 
Geological and paleontological 
evidence for long ages. Computer 
models using measurable and 
verifiable variables.
Plausibility So claimed by adherents. So claimed by adherents.
Presentation Testimonial. The original 
text provides a brief  
and limited description 
of  how creation 
happened. This account 
is a prolegomena to a 
narrative of  which the 
primary purpose was to 
establish the identity of  
the people of  Israel.
Testimonial. The general theory 
emerged out of  inferences drawn 
from new data using assumptions 
that questioned “religion” and the 
validity of  ancient texts. 
27Fuller, 6. Fuller notes that “In short, debates over the scientific probity of  ID/
creationism and Neo-Darwinism have little to do with evidence per se but a lot to do 
with who speaks for the evidence, which in turn is a matter of  permissible explanatory 
frameworks in science. In this context, the Popperian phrase, “metaphysical research 
program” comes in handy, since the closer one inspects the genuine points of  
disagreement between ID/creationism and Neo-Darwinism, the more metaphysical 
they become.”
28Paul A. Boghossian, Fear of  Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 1-7. He defines the problem of  equal validity by 
popular media references to Lakota and Zuni human-origin myths, which are justified 
as “different ways of  knowing.”
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Hebrews 11 as a Biblical Response
Many of  the key epistemological problems, as outlined above, were debated in 
the Hellenistic world of  the first century. New Testament authors addressed 
these problems creatively in ways that affirmed the faith of  the early church. 
For the purposes of  this essay, one example will be discussed.
In the book of  Hebrews, the author makes the claim: “Now faith is 
confidence in what we hope for and assurance about what we do not see”29 
(11:1). While the context of  the book, and, more particularly, the argument that 
follows make clear that the “in what”—that which is outside the immediate 
field of  sense perception and yet to take place—refers to the promises given 
by God through the Scriptures and through Jesus Christ,30 I suggest that the 
principle invoked could apply to any belief  formed on the basis of  testimony 
apart from perception. Thus I argue that the epistemic status of  a belief  
formed solely by reliance on testimony is an act of  faith.31 In Hebrews, that 
act of  faith is warranted by the reliability of  God as revealed through Jesus 
Christ. When applied to the creation/evolution debate, it requires an act of  
faith to commit to either account. As further evidenced in Heb 11:3, “By faith 
we understand that the universe was formed at God’s command, so that what 
is seen was not made out of  what was visible.” It is also an act of  faith to 
claim that humanity evolved after a long process.
Exegetes and English-language translators have long struggled with 
whether Heb 11:1 should be interpreted as objective or subjective.32 The 
translation quoted in the previous paragraph represents the subjective 
interpretation.33 A translation representative of  the objective interpretation 
29Unless otherwise indicated, Scripture quotations are from the NIV.
30R. L. Brawley, “Discoursive Structure and the Unseen in Hebrews 2:8 and 11:1: 
A Neglected Aspect of  the Context,” CBQ 55/1 (1993): 97-98.
31Polanyi, 243. “But whether our confidence in the powers of  our comprehension 
arises spontaneously from the depth of  our inquiring mind or leans on our trust in 
the judgment of  our teachers, it is always an act of  hope akin to the dynamism of  all 
human faith.”
32James D. Smith III, “Faith as Substance or Surety: Historical Perspectives 
on Hypostasis in Hebrews 11:1,” in The Challenge of  Bible Translation: Communicating 
God’s Word to the World: Essays in Honor of  Ronald F. Youngblood, ed. Glen G. Scorgie, 
Mark L. Strauss, and Steven M. Voth (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2003), 381-392. 
It has been argued that the objective/subjective distinction broadly conceived was 
first systematized during the Enlightenment, most notably by Descartes, and that 
this distinction so construed has created an unwarranted disconnect between faith 
and reason. See Newbigin, 29-44; James R. Peters, The Logic of  the Heart: Augustine, 
Pascal, and the Rationality of  Faith (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2009), 16-17; Dallas 
Willard, Knowing Christ Today: Why We Can Trust Spiritual Knowledge, 1st ed. (New York: 
HarperOne, 2009), 23-26.
33William J. Abraham, “Faith, Assurance, and Conviction: An Epistemological 
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reads: “Faith is the reality of  what we hope for, the proof  of  what we don’t 
see” (CEB).34 “Confidence” and “assurance” emphasize the knower’s internal 
subjective response, while “reality” and “proof ” emphasize the external-mind-
independent status of  the knowable object. Valid arguments are given for 
both interpretations, so let me suggest that because of  the ambiguity of  the 
original Greek in conjunction with the constraints of  English as a language, 
our understanding of  “faith” should expand to include both meanings. 
Thus faith brings together both objective reality and proof  with subjective 
confidence and assurance. 
Faith is not needed for beliefs formed through perception, but only 
for beliefs formed from testimony. From the perspective of  the novice 
information seeker, when there are competing accounts, she must evaluate 
the authority, corroboration, plausibility, and presentation of  the testimony 
received. On the creation/evolution question, I suggest that the issue of  
authority takes priority, and that it is a commitment on that question that 
determines the subsequent outcomes in belief  formation. In other words, 
faith is prior to knowledge; commitment precedes knowing.35
Conclusion
The standards for the evaluation of  information (authority, independent 
corroboration, plausibility and support, and presentation, as conventionally 
conceived in higher education), thus prove inadequate in and of  themselves 
to aid the novice information seeker to come to a personal conclusion on 
the creation/evolution debate. These standards thus applied do, however, 
challenge a naive certainty in either account of  human origins because both 
accounts find support among credible scientific authorities who competently 
present their diverse interpretations of  the same verifiable data that reasonably 
appear to corroborate and validate the preferred account. 
Commentary on Hebrews 11:1,” Ex auditu 19 (2003): 65-75.
34This translation is argued for by Robert G. Hoerber, “On the Translation of  
Hebrews 11:1,” Concordia Journal 21/1 (1995): 77-79.
35Polanyi argued for this priority in Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical 
Philosophy, corrected ed. (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 1962). He further 
applied the principle to religious knowing in idem, “Faith and Reason,” 237-247. We 
come to know “only by relying on our awareness of  numberless particulars, most 
of  which we could never specify in themselves” (ibid., 245). He concludes his essay 
by stating, “Here we have a paradigm of  the Pauline scheme of  faith, works and 
grace. The discoverer works in the belief  that his labors will prepare his mind for 
receiving a truth from sources over which he has no control. I regard the Pauline 
scheme therefore as the only adequate conception of  scientific discovery” (ibid., 247). 
Building on Polanyi’s work, Newbigin expands and more explicitly applies the priority 
of  faith in Jesus to knowledge in Proper Confidence.
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It is also within the scope of  information-literacy-based critical-thinking 
dispositions for the novice information seeker to observe that both sets 
of  interpretations are arguably derived from presuppositions grounded in 
a diverse socially constructed worldview, and thus each claim becomes in 
essence a “testimony” to perceived reality as experienced by the interpreter/
interpretive community rather than an objective mind-independent reality. 
And so it might be assumed that the equal-validity doctrine inherent in much 
of  the humanities and social-science discussions applies here. Yet admitting 
this is neither intuitive nor “realistic” nor ontologically satisfying.
From these observations, it is suggested that for the novice information 
seeker, accepting one account over the other be appreciated as an act of  
faith in a given testimony. Therefore, the seeker may need to move beyond 
the particulars of  the information, and make further interpretive choices 
warranted by the credibility and authority of  the interpretive community in 
its holistic engagement with reality. 
It is the experience of  many that God as revealed in the Judeo/Christian 
Scriptures corresponds to this holistic conception of  reality and has been 
proven to their satisfaction to be a reliable authority. In a direct challenge to 
contemporary scientism, the Hebrew Scriptures reflect this appreciation of  
authority by giving voice to the Creator God, “Where were you when I laid 
the earth’s foundation?  Tell me, if  you understand.” (Job 38:4). And in the 
Christian Scriptures the Gospel of  John affirms it: “In the beginning was the 
Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was with God 
in the beginning. Through him all things were made; without him nothing 
was made that has been made. In him was life, and that life was the light of  
all mankind.” (John 1:1-4). Given this acceptance of  Scriptural testimony to 
divine authority for human origins, the appeal for faith enunciated by the 
author of  Hebrews coherently follows, “And without faith it is impossible 
to please God, because anyone who comes to him must believe that he 
exists and that he rewards those who earnestly seek him.” (vs. 6). From this 
admittedly subjective stance,36 it could be argued that the best evidence for 
human origins might be found in the realities of  “life” as now experienced 
rather than in the data gleaned from the “past,” which usually proves sketchy, 
incomplete, and subject to diverse interpretations. 
36Though, I would suggest, no more subjective than the stance underlying the 
standard evolutionary account.
